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The Effect of Participative Budgeting on Performance-to-Goal
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.advisor | 신재용 | - |
dc.contributor.author | 백인균 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-07-14T05:20:33Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2017-07-14T05:20:33Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2016-08 | - |
dc.identifier.other | 000000137137 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10371/124692 | - |
dc.description | 학위논문 (석사)-- 서울대학교 대학원 : 경영학과 회계학전공, 2016. 8. 신재용. | - |
dc.description.abstract | Despite continued popularity of participative budgeting, prior studies in this area resort to proprietary survey data, laboratory experimental evidence, or data from single firms with multi-business units due to a lack of detailed information related to participative budgeting. Using a sample of 633 firm-year observations from S&P 1500 firms for fiscal years 2009 to 2011, I examine the relation between the use of participative budgeting and performance-to-goal. First, I find that the performance-to-goal of participative budgeting firms is higher than that of non-participative budgeting firms. Second, I investigate whether higher performance-to-goal is driven by motivational effects or slack building activities triggered by participative budgeting. I decompose performance-to-goal into effort level and budgetary slack using analysts forecasts as the benchmark to show that motivational effects dominate and result in higher performance-to-goal for participative budgeting firms. Overall, this study reaffirms the continued popularity of participative budgeting in a budget-setting process. | - |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 1. INTRODUCTION 1
2. RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 6 2.1. Related Literature 6 2.2. Research Question 10 2.3. The First Mechanism: The Effect of Participative Budgeting Use on Effort toward Performance 11 2.4. The Second Mechanism: The Effect of Participative Budgeting Use on Effort toward Goal Negotiation 12 3. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND SAMPLE SELECTION 14 3.1. The New SEC Disclosure Rules on Executive Compensation 14 3.2. Sample Construction and Descriptive Statistics 15 4. RESEARCH DESIGN, SUMMARY STATISTICS, AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 18 4.1. Research Design 18 4.2. Summary Statistics 22 4.3. Empirical Results 24 4.4. Robustness Tests 26 5. CONCLUSION 27 APPENDIX 29 REFERENCES 32 | - |
dc.format | application/pdf | - |
dc.format.extent | 775522 bytes | - |
dc.format.medium | application/pdf | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | 서울대학교 대학원 | - |
dc.subject | Participative budgeting | - |
dc.subject | Motivational Effect | - |
dc.subject | Budgetary slack | - |
dc.subject.ddc | 658 | - |
dc.title | The Effect of Participative Budgeting on Performance-to-Goal | - |
dc.type | Thesis | - |
dc.description.degree | Master | - |
dc.citation.pages | 44 | - |
dc.contributor.affiliation | 경영대학 경영학과 | - |
dc.date.awarded | 2016-08 | - |
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