Ma Ying-jeou's Foreign Aid Policy: Two-Level Game Analysis

Abstract

Under the special Cross-Strait dispute context, foreign aid policy in Taiwan has become a necessary means for the government to exchange for diplomatic support from the recipient countries and to establish its legitimacy in the international society. This practice has made the countrys aid long attached with the negative image of dollar diplomacy or checkbook diplomacy. Since Ma Ying-jeou came to presidency in 2008, his different policy choice towards China has done several changes to the Taiwanese foreign aid. This paper draws from the theoretical framework of Two-Level Game and examines Ma Ying-jeous foreign aid policy making process through both international and domestic levels of bargaining. It argues that the two levels coincide on the opinion of an improved foreign aid image while disagree on the foreign aid budget. As a consequence, Ma Ying-jeous foreign aid policy presents a different practice and outcome in the process of balancing these two level of constraints.