A Quinean Critique of Chalmers' Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics

Abstract

My masters thesis is a Quinean critique of David Chalmers semantic theory, epistemic two-dimensional semantics. I criticize his epistemic two-dimensional semantics by providing a Quinean critique of his assumption that there is clear distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori, which plays a fundamental role in constructing his semantic theory. In chapter 1, I discuss Chalmers epistemic two-dimensional semantics, which is intended as a vindication of Fregean semantics, and the role of the a priori in the vindication. I argue that it is paramount to define an expressions primary intension, which plays Fregean sense roles, and that the definition of primary intensions fundamentally depends on the assumption that there is the a priori/a posteriori distinction. In chapter 2, I examine Chalmers response to Quines attack on the a priori. According to Chalmers understanding of Quines attack, Quine argues that every sentence is revisable (revisability), and thus there is no distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori. Against Quines argument, Chalmers attempts to draw the principled distinction between revisability involving conceptual change and the one without conceptual change. He then argues that revisability is consistent with the a priori/a posteriori distinction, and thus Quines attack on the a priori fails. In chapter 3, I scrutinize Quines critique of Carnaps a priori relative to a language in Two Dogmas of Empiricism. I argue that Carnapian distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori is repudiated by two Quinean doctrines, epistemological holism and underdetermination of theory by evidence. In chapter 4, I will provide a Quinean critique of Chalmers rejoinder to Quines attack on the a priori and of Chalmers semantic theory. The two Quinean doctrines imply that there is no distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori. On the basis of this implication, I argue that Chalmers rejoinder fails and moreover his semantic theory would be repudiated.