Disagreement and Newly Understood Equal Weight View

Abstract

The problem of epistemic disagreement is a problem of rationality in a broad sense. Epistemic disagreement occurs in situations where cognitive subjects who are epistemically equivalent with each other in their reasoning ability arrive different conclusions from the same set of evidence. The question is how should the disputants should revise their original opinions after noticing the disagreement. In Chapter I, I will introduce this question in detail and enumerate contesting theories on this issue. Among them, I will defend the Equal Weight View as a most intuitive answer to the present question. Chapters II and III will each be independent attempts to argue for the Equal Weight View. In Chapter II, I will enter into the controversy between advocates of uniqueness and permissivists. This dispute is known to be closely related with the problem of epistemic disagreement. I will maintain that the controversy between the two theses provides us a reason to prefer the Equal Weight View. In Chapter III, the internal issues of epistemic disagreement will be discussed. Admitting the core creed of the Equal Weight View, I will suggest a new understanding about the theory. My final aim is to show how the new version of the theory can explicate the existing problems that have been raised against the original theory.