Leibniz's Notion of Composibility

Abstract

In this thesis, I evaluate the different interpretations of Leibniz's notion of compossibility. Scholars have distinguished two ways to explicate Leibniz's position. On the one hand, proponents of the logical interpretation argue that compossibility implies a logical relation between substances complete concepts. That is, nothing more than the consideration of complete concepts is required. On the other, proponents of the lawful interpretation argue that relations of lawfulness and orderliness are necessary in evaluating compossibility claims. James Messina and Donald Rutherford argue that neither the logical nor lawful interpretation is an adequate account of Leibniz's position, and propose a novel interpretation of compossibility. I argue, however, that this novel interpretation is flawed. Messina and Rutherford's reason for rejecting the lawful interpretation is as much as a reason to reject their interpretation, or so I argue.