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Information acquisition in common value auction
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.advisor | 김진우 | - |
| dc.contributor.author | 강두성 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-07-19T12:35:41Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2017-07-19T12:35:41Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2014-02 | - |
| dc.identifier.other | 000000018285 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10371/134622 | - |
| dc.description | 학위논문 (석사)-- 서울대학교 대학원 : 경제학부, 2014. 2. 김진우. | - |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper deals with the information acquisition in a common value auction model. In the simple case of two bidders, we reach the conclusion that the conventionally known statement that the auctioneer's revenue is higher in the case of English auction than in the second price auction at equilibrium after each bidder's optimization is not quite true, but the contrary is correct. | - |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 1. Introduction
1.1 Related literature 2. The model 2.1 Information acquisition in Second price auction 2.2 Information acquisition in English auction 2.3 Comparing the Revenue 3. Concluding remarks A. Appendix A.1 mathematical analysis of Second price auction A.2 mathematical analysis of English auction | - |
| dc.format | application/pdf | - |
| dc.format.extent | 372597 bytes | - |
| dc.format.medium | application/pdf | - |
| dc.language.iso | en | - |
| dc.publisher | 서울대학교 대학원 | - |
| dc.subject | common value auction | - |
| dc.subject | Information acquisition | - |
| dc.subject.ddc | 330 | - |
| dc.title | Information acquisition in common value auction | - |
| dc.type | Thesis | - |
| dc.description.degree | Master | - |
| dc.citation.pages | xvi,16 | - |
| dc.contributor.affiliation | 사회과학대학 경제학부 | - |
| dc.date.awarded | 2014-02 | - |
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