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A random assignment of indivisible goods in single-peaked economies with a common peak

DC Field Value Language
dc.contributor.advisor전영섭-
dc.contributor.author장희인-
dc.date.accessioned2017-07-19T12:40:16Z-
dc.date.available2017-07-19T12:40:16Z-
dc.date.issued2016-08-
dc.identifier.other000000137196-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10371/134720-
dc.description학위논문 (석사)-- 서울대학교 대학원 : 경제학부 경제학전공, 2016. 8. 전영섭.-
dc.description.abstractBogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) show that there is no rule satisfying equal treatment of equals, sd-efficiency and sd-strategyproofness for a random assignment problem of indivisible goods. Furthermore, Kasajima (2013) shows that the incompatibility result holds when agents have single-peaked preferences. In this paper, we restrict the domain by requiring that all agents have a common peak and investigate the existence of rules satisfying the three axioms. We show that the three axioms are still incompatible. As it turns out, the three axioms are still incompatible even though all agents have the same preferences except the three least-preferable objects.-
dc.description.tableofcontents1. Introduction 1

2. Model 3

3. Results 6

4. Conclusion 13

Appendix : A formal proof for odd n 14

References 21
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dc.formatapplication/pdf-
dc.format.extent398616 bytes-
dc.format.mediumapplication/pdf-
dc.language.isoen-
dc.publisher서울대학교 대학원-
dc.subjectProbabilistic assignment-
dc.subjectindivisible goods-
dc.subjectimpossibility result-
dc.subject.ddc330-
dc.titleA random assignment of indivisible goods in single-peaked economies with a common peak-
dc.typeThesis-
dc.description.degreeMaster-
dc.citation.pages21-
dc.contributor.affiliation사회과학대학 경제학부-
dc.date.awarded2016-08-
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