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Revenue sharing on hierarchies : 위계조직상의 수익 배분

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Authors

정수정

Advisor
주병기
Major
사회과학대학 경제학부
Issue Date
2017-02
Publisher
서울대학교 대학원
Keywords
Revenue sharingHierarchyReallocation-proofnessCoalitional manipulationNon-manipulabilityTransfer ruleGeneralized transfer rule
Description
학위논문 (석사)-- 서울대학교 대학원 : 경제학부, 2017. 2. 주병기.
Abstract
We consider a model of joint venture where agents form a hierarchical network and each agent produces her revenue through collaborating with her superiors. We study the problemof allocating the total revenue among the agents. A hierarchy is represented by a directed tree. We investigate allocation rules that are robust to coalitional manipulations through allocating revenues within a coalition. A coalitional manipulation is feasible when the coalition is connected and includes all the superiors of its members. We characterize families of nonmanipulable rules that satisfy standard axioms in the literature of fair allocation theory.
Language
English
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/10371/134744
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