Browse

The Optimal Government Shareholding Strategy and the Cost Structure

DC Field Value Language
dc.contributor.authorHuang, ChinShu-
dc.contributor.authorLee, JenYao-
dc.contributor.authorChen, ShihShen-
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-30-
dc.date.available2009-01-30-
dc.date.issued2006-04-
dc.identifier.citationSeoul Journal of Economics, Vol.19 No.2, pp. 251-274-
dc.identifier.issn1225-0279-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10371/1354-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes government's optimal shareholding strategy within the framework of the mixed oligopoly. It is found that: (1) When both public and domestic firms have the same cost coefficient, the government's best policy is to adopt the full mixed oligopoly. (2) When the cost coefficient of the public firm is lower than a threshold value, the government should opt for a full mixed-oligopoly policy. However, when the public firm's cost coefficient is higher than the threshold value, the government should privatize the public firm completely and exit the market. The single mixed oligopoly is just an alternative proposal when it fails to transform all of the private firms into mixed ownership enterprises.-
dc.language.isoen-
dc.publisherInstitute of Economic Research, Seoul National University-
dc.subjectpublic firm-
dc.subjectmixed oligopoly-
dc.subjectPrivatization-
dc.subjectmixed ownership enterprise-
dc.titleThe Optimal Government Shareholding Strategy and the Cost Structure-
dc.typeSNU Journal-
dc.citation.journaltitleSeoul Journal of Economics-
dc.citation.endpage274-
dc.citation.number2-
dc.citation.pages251-274-
dc.citation.startpage251-
dc.citation.volume19-
Appears in Collections:
College of Social Sciences (사회과학대학)Institute of Economics Research (경제연구소)Seoul Journal of EconomicsSeoul Journal of Economics vol.19(2) (Summer 2006)
Files in This Item:
  • mendeley

Items in S-Space are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

Browse