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CEO Inside Debt and Financing Choice : 최고경영자의 이연보상 및 연금이 기업의 자금조달선택에 미치는 영향
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- Authors
- Advisor
- 황인이
- Major
- 경영대학 경영학과
- Issue Date
- 2017-08
- Publisher
- 서울대학교 대학원
- Keywords
- executive compensation ; inside debt ; agency costs of debt ; external financing
- Description
- 학위논문 (석사)-- 서울대학교 대학원 경영대학 경영학과, 2017. 8. 황인이.
- Abstract
- This paper examines the effects of CEO inside debt on firms financing behavior in the funding process. Consistent with prior literature suggesting the beneficial effect of CEO inside debt on the firms debt contracting environment, I find that firms with large CEO inside debt use more debt issuance and less cash holdings in funding the financing deficit caused by investments and payouts in excess of operating cash flows. I show the observed effects of CEO inside debt are more pronounced for financially constrained firms that have difficulty in accessing external capital markets. Overall, my evidence highlights the importance of incorporating the financing implications of inside debt in the optimal design of executive compensation contracts.
- Language
- English
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