The Inevitable Stalemate: A Two-Level Game Analysis of the Futenma Base Relocation in Okinawa

Abstract

Ever since the 1995 Okinawa rape incident, the relationship between Okinawa and Japan and the United States has soured. Hoping to amend local discontent, in 1996, both governments agreed on relocating Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to Camp Schwab, Henoko bay within five to seven years. Interestingly, the two-decade old agreement to establish the Futenma Relocation Facility on Henoko bay has not occurred. Although the societal, environmental and security concerns regarding the Okinawa base problem are not completely ignored, existing literature fails to analyze and circumvent the reasons behind delay. This thesis contributes to debate by addressing why the Henoko relocation has stalled for the past twenty years. Loosely applying Putnams Two-Level Game Analysis, this thesis will present the argument that the United States of America and Japan, believing that security takes precedence over Okinawa interest, knowingly engaged in negotiations given the poor prospects in Okinawan consent. Negotiations were determined to be time consuming and difficult from the beginning due to the low win-set as revealed by initial Okinawan resistance.