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Risk Sharing with Rank-dependent Utility
순위의존 효용하에서의 위험공유

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Authors
김민
Advisor
Yves Gueron
Major
사회과학대학 경제학부
Issue Date
2017-08
Publisher
서울대학교 대학원
Keywords
Risk sharingLimited commitmentRepeated game with random statesRank-dependent utility
Description
학위논문 (석사)-- 서울대학교 대학원 사회과학대학 경제학부, 2017. 8. Yves Gueron.
Abstract
Risk-averse agents prefer to be fully insured against the fluctuations on their endowments. One way to avoid consumption risks is to agree upon endowment transfers among them. This kind of informal insurance is what we call a risk sharing. Over an infinite time horizon, the agents can be better off through risk sharing if they are sufficiently patient.
We extend Mailath and Samuelson (2006) by allowing types of agents. A standard agent may benefit from having a pessimistic agent under rank-dependent utility as his risk sharing partner. Furthermore, it is much easier for them to have full insurance in equilibrium. We characterize a lower bound of the efficient frontier when the two agents are not patient enough. We also present our results with numerical examples.
Language
English
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10371/137817
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College of Social Sciences (사회과학대학)Dept. of Economics (경제학부)Theses (Master's Degree_경제학부)
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