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Strategic Interactions in Networks: An Experimental Approach

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Authors
이응익
Advisor
최승주
Major
사회과학대학 경제학부
Issue Date
2017-08
Publisher
서울대학교 대학원
Keywords
Networklocal public good gamesexperimentstrategic substitute
Description
학위논문 (석사)-- 서울대학교 대학원 사회과학대학 경제학부, 2017. 8. 최승주.
Abstract
This paper experimentally investigates how global and local characteristics of a network influence the equilibrium selection and behavior in a network public goods game. Bramoullé et al. (2014) shows that the equilibrium of the public good game can be characterized according to the simple characteristics of the underlying network. Precisely, guided by the theoretical predictions from Bramoullé et al. (2014), I explore whether underlying networks can predict equilibrium selection and subjectsbehavior in the controlled laboratory. The data implies that 1) there is some aspect in which agents actions are consistent with the claims of Bramoullé et al.(2014), but 2) local, rather than global, characteristics of the network are more fundamental in influencing behavior and equilibrium selection. Specifically, I show that asymmetry inside of a network is a major factor that explains the actions of
individual economic agents.
Language
English
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/10371/137818
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College of Social Sciences (사회과학대학)Dept. of Economics (경제학부)Theses (Master's Degree_경제학부)
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