Explaining North Korean Nuclear Strategy Under Kim Jong-Un: A Comparative Study of a Coercive Bargaining and "Madman" Model

Abstract

Policy-makers and political scientists agree that North Korea intends to become a nuclear weapons power, but there is a lack of consensus on how North Korea intends to make this goal a reality. For the past few decades, North Korea has often slowed down or sped up its pursuit of nuclear weapons in unexpected and seemingly irrational ways. Explaining North Koreas varying nuclear strategy has become even more pertinent under the rule of Kim Jong-Un, whose country grows closer to intercontinental and second-strike nuclear capabilities every day. In attempt to evaluate some of the theoretical approaches to this research topic, this study examines and compares the explanatory power of two theoretical models as applied to North Korean nuclear strategy: a coercive bargaining model created by Victor Cha and a madman model created by Avidit Acharya and Edoardo Grillo. The coercive bargaining model, based on power transition theory and prospect theory, rationalizes North Koreas acceptance of risky nuclear strategy choices through its perception of its own position in the international system. The madman model, based on two-sided incomplete information game theory, extols the logic of North Korea acting crazy to illicit greater strategic outcomes for itself. A congruence test is used to see whether the predictions of the models co-vary with North Korean transitions in nuclear strategy from fast to slow, or vice versa, from the years 2011 to 2017.