British Euroscepticism Manifested in Cameron's Bungling Referendum

Abstract

After the result of Brexit vote in 2016, there has been an increase of literature trying to explain the factors that led to it. Out of many variables, British Euroscepticism has gained scholarly attention as the main cause that attributed to Britains troubling relationship with the European Union since its membership. Out of varying facets of Euroscepticism such as economic, political, and cultural that contributed to Britains opposition to supranational entity, it has most usefully been conceived as a systemic feature of British Politics. This indicates that political Euroscepticism has persisted in the parliamentary arena where the ministers had persistently displayed their discontent towards the EU in voting. As a result, the increasing political Euroscepticism threatened the intra-party cohesion from 2010 to 2015 as the Members of Parliament (MPs) rebelled more frequently against the government to have invited David Cameron to utilize party management tactics more aggressively. Thus, this thesis attempts to answer what led David Cameron to promise and hold the national referendum on EU and more specifically, what led him to move from the six tools of intra-party management to the final one of holding a referendum. In other words, Brexit referendum promise was a political gamble of then Prime Minister, David Cameron. Nonetheless, political Euroscepticism was not a new phenomenon that emerged only from Camerons term, but rather it was boiling inside the British political realm for decades. The Conservative Party under David Camerons leadership is observed from 2005 to 2010 because while a call for a national referendum occurred repeatedly throughout Britains marriage with the EU, it was ultimately a self-inflicted result of Cameron. He had misjudged and erred in deciding to go ahead with referendum in 2016 instead of 2017 because he was confident that he had successfully renegotiated the terms.

Therefore, to understand the nature of high level political Euroscepticism found in the British parliament displayed through dissent during Camerons premiership, a further scrutiny of British Euroscepticism before Cameron is outlined. The structure of the thesis is organized into five chapters. After a brief introductory chapter, theoretical framework and research design on Euroscepticism, leadership behavior, and intra-party model are delineated. By looking at the economic, cultural, and political Euroscepticism, possible explanations of how each facet may have intensified into causing Brexit can be identified. Yet, Chapter 3 demonstrates that it was decisively the British Political Euroscepticism of the Conservative Party that had ultimately impacted Brexit Furthermore, the UK nature of political system and other leaders strategies on EU such as those of Thatcher and Major are compared to Camerons leadership tactics. Then, Chapter 4 introduces ways to measure dissent and the significance they have on affecting the intra-party nature and tactics Cameron utilized. Finally, it explains how Camerons tactics varied with increasing Euroscepticism that made the need for putting the EU issue on a national referendum more urgent. This studys finding is that intra-party cohesion influences leadership behavior even if it means taking radical measures such as moving the decision to the electorate level, which elites usually attempt to avoid. This is likely to be the outcome of political Euroscepticism within the Conservative Party that threatened the viability of the party.

As David Cameron sought to solve the intra-party dissension by promising a national referendum, it soon proved not to be enough. To make matters worse, Cameron was juggling his EU partners, allies, and citizens in addition to his Eurosceptics. As he attempted to appease all sides, he further antagonized them all leaving him with no credibility as the leader. Consequently, his renegotiated EU membership terms did not appear convincing enough to make the UK exit the union.