Russias Multilateral Strategy to the North Korean Nuclear Problem

Abstract

The research attempts to understand why Russia has consistently chosen a multilateral approach

to the North Korean nuclear issue from the early 1990s to 2016. Although the explanations

focusing on great power ambitions, national interests and balancing between two Koreas are

accurate and supported by sufficient empirical evidence, they overlook why Russia has chosen

the same strategy for the 23 years. Neither explanation is explicit with regards to why Moscow

has viewed the six-party talks (6PT) as a the most optimal way of dealing with the North Korean

problem. The paper argues that while the North Korean nuclear issue has direct consequences for

Russia, it is nonetheless one in which Russia can take a relatively passive stance compared to

other regions in the world. This passive stance in the form of participation in a multilateral

framework however was not an indicator of lack of interest. Evidence suggests that Russia wants

to be closely involved in the North Korean issue and has its interests at stake. However, given

the immediate priorities in other parts of the world combined with weak leverages of influence

over the North, Russia is unable to play a more assertive role in the North Korean issue. Russia

was therefore content being a member of the 6PT, as long as it was able to exert institutional

power, was consulted and viewed as an equal partner.