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Strategic Challengers and the Incumbency Advantage

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Authors
Kang, Insun
Issue Date
2018-06
Publisher
서울대학교 미국학연구소
Citation
미국학, Vol.41 No.1, pp. 133-178
Keywords
Incumbency advantagestrategic challengersUS electionselectoral campaignformal modeling of repeated elections
Abstract
The existing formal studies on the incumbency advantage do not take strategicchoices of electoral challengers into account. We develop a dynamic model ofinfinitely repeated electoral competition that incorporates strategic challengers andshows the endogenous emergence of the incumbency advantage. Politicianscharacteristics are of two dimensions, policy and quality. We assume that policypreferences are heterogeneous among players but everyone prefers to elect a highquality candidate. Candidates types which are defined by policy preference andquality are private information but by observing the incumbents policy choicevoters know the incumbents type while nothing is revealed about a challenger.With a strategic challenger we find an equilibrium in which only high qualitychallengers campaign to distinguish themselves from low quality challengers andwin the election. However, we still find a strong incumbency advantage accruingfrom voters ignorance about the challengers policy preference relative to theirknowledge of the incumbent.
ISSN
1229-4381
Language
English
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/10371/147085
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Researcher Institutes (연구소, 연구원)American Studies Institute (미국학연구소)미국학미국학 Volume 41 Number 1/2 (2018)
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