A Study on the DPRKs Regime Survival Strategy through Conceptual Framework of the Soft Power Dilemma

Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the dynamics of North Koreas regime survival strategy through the conceptual framework of the soft power dilemma. To analyze the critical factors likely to determine the sustainability of the North Korean regime, this thesis examined previous studies on both domestic and international survival strategies. A study on the interactions between the two levels elucidates that North Koreas social cohesion strategy helped mobilize its domestic audience, as well as created a hostile and an unstable international image resulting in isolation of North Korea.

The Kangseong Daekuk (Strong and Prosperous Nation) slogan is an example of many soft power resources related to nationalism that helps mobilize the domestic audience in the DPRK through attractive ideas and symbols, while at the same time creates a hostile international image. This is the soft power dilemma pushing away other nation-states. Such dilemma is the limitation of North Koreas soft power which can be explained by Geun Lees concept of the soft power dilemma. Therefore, the domestic social cohesion strategy created a negative international environment, resulting in an internationally unstable regime survival environment.

Borrowing from Robert Putnams two level game metaphor, this thesis attempts to reveal North Koreas Soft Power using Joseph Nyes concept of Soft Power and Geun Lees concept of Soft Power Dilemma .