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신후담(愼後聃) 『대학후설(大學後說)』의 새로운 성찰: 이패림(李沛霖)의 『사서주자이동조변(四書朱子異同條辨)』과 비교하여 : Shin Hu-Dams New Reflections in Daehakhuseol: comparing with Li Pei-lins interpretations

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Authors

임부연

Issue Date
2016-12
Publisher
서울대학교 종교문제연구소
Citation
종교와 문화, Vol.31, pp. 123-162
Keywords
하빈(河濱) 신후담(愼後聃)대학후설(大學後說)이패림(李沛霖)사서주자이동조변(四書朱子異同條辨)고본대학(古本大學)주자(朱子)명덕(明德)지선(至善)격물(格物)치지(致知)성의(誠意)정심(正心)경(敬)왕양명(王陽明)Habin Shin Hu-DamDaehakhuseolLi Pei-linSaseoZhuXiidongjobyeonthe Ancient Text DaehakZhu Ximyeongdeok
Abstract
This article is aimed to investigate Habin(河濱) Shin Hu-Dam(愼後聃, 1702~1761)`s new reflections in Daehakhuseol(大學後說) based on the Ancient Text Daehak(古本大學) by comparing with Li Pei-lin(李沛霖)`s SaseoZhuXiidongjobyeon(四書朱子異同條辨) that accepted Zhu Xi(朱子)`s restructured version of Daehak(大學章句). First, Shin Hu-Dam defined myeongdeok(明德) penetrating the whole Daehak not as mind-heart but as luminous nature like Li Pei-lin. But, while Li Pei-lin regarded heoryeong(虛靈) as the essential character of myeongdeok, Habin insisted that heoryeong, as the character of mind-heart`s substance, had nothing to do with myeongdeok. Especially Habin, confining the subject of myeongdeok to human being, interpreted myeongdeok as the public principle of human relations, namely the perfect goodness(至善) and reinforced its practico-ethical aspect. As a result, the task of resting in perfect goodness was reduced to establishing the ethical subject. Second, with regard to the theme of knowledge, Habin sought to find the contents of gyeokmul(格物) and chiji(致知) within the Ancient Text Daehak on the basis of corresponding relations between three principia(三綱領) and eight items(八條目). In consequence, gyeokmul was redefined as the discrimination between myeongmyeongdeok(明明德) and sinmin(新民) based on the model of the root and the branch. Especially, his concept of gyeokmul had the new meaning of correcting the order of myeongmyeongdeok and sinmin. And chiji was redefined as the exhausting our knowledge of ethical principles rather than extending our knowledge of all things to utmost. Meanwhile, Li Pei-lin accepted the Zhu Xi`s supplementary chapter on gyeokmul and chiji(格物補傳) and reduced gyeokmul and chiji to a matter of myeongmyeongdeok`s practice by criticizing Wang Yang Ming(王陽明)`s emphasis on the innate substance of mind-heart. Third, with regard to mind-heart practice, Habin restored the main status of the chapter on seongui(誠意) and made seongui as the fundamental practice penetrating three principia and eight items. In contrast, Li Pei-lin regarded seongui as only one item like Zhu Xi. Especially, Habin stressed the impotance of sindok(愼獨) as the road from self-deception(自欺) to self-satisfaction(自謙). And he insisted that jeongsim(正心) included the practice of the mind-heart`s substance as well as its functions. As a result, jeongsim was related with the centrality(中) of mibal(未發) in Jungyong(中庸). But, Habin succeeded the notion of Zhu Xi`s gyeong(敬) as the way of acquiring the sovereignty over mind-heart and interpreted the practice of jeongsim as a mode of gyeong. In summary, Shin Hu-Dam developed his own distinguishing views on Daehak that were different from those of Zhu Xi and Wang Yang Ming without leaving the Zhu Xi`s tradition stressing the ethical sovereignty over mind-heart.
ISSN
1976-7900
Language
Korean
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/10371/162668
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College of Humanities (인문대학)Religious Studies (종교학과)종교와 문화(Religion and Culture)종교와 문화(Religion and Culture) 30/31호(2016)
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