Auditors' Responses to Organized Labor in Client Firms

Abstract

Using a sample of US firms for the period 2000-2011, we examine whether organized labor in audit client firms affects auditor decisions such as audit fees and going-concern qualifications. We find that labor unionization is associated with higher audit fees and a higher likelihood of going-concern qualifications but shorter audit report lags, and the results on audit fees are stronger in the case of strikes. These results suggest that the presence of labor union(s) in a client firm constitutes a non-trivial risk element to auditors, which cannot be mitigated by additional audit effort. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] Copyright of Seoul Journal of Business is the property of Seoul National University, College of Business Administration and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)