Extended-Deterrent Effect of Russia and Its Implications for the U.S.-N.Korean Nuclear Negotiation

Abstract

This paper aims to examine whether extended deterrence of Russia over its military allies or trading partners is credible. I argue that alliance commitments of Russias autocratic leaders with ambivalent deterrence policy are unlikely to deter foreign aggressions. Through the multinomial logit analysis, I have found that there is little evidence that countries that formed military alliances or trade linkages with Russia are likely to increase deterrence success. Rather than hindering disputes, Russias military alliances are likely to engage in disputes, and more likely in war. Russias trading linkages have no discernible effect on disputes. These findings imply that faced with the lack of credible alliance, N. Korea could be driven into a hands-tied paradox. To escape this dilemma, the U.S. seems more likely to accept the practical goal, the reduction of the direct N. Koreas threat which may bring about the cold peace in Northeast Asia.