서독 지멘스 (Siemens) 기업사로 보는 한독관계 1961-1980

Abstract

In this thesis, I examined the German company Siemens in Korea during the period of rapid economic development under Park Chung Hee. I especially focused on the participation of Siemens in developmental aid projects of the German government which culminated in the joint venture with the Korean chaebol Goldstar. Siemens influenced the decisions of the German government concerning the German developmental aid policies. Siemens also used the German government to work for their own personal interests. However, the case study also reconfirmed the strong state theory as the Korean government had the most influence in decisions concerning developmental projects and could single-handedly decide the future of Siemens' business in Korea. At the same time, the study confirms once again the importance of technology transfer and technical aid for economic development not only on a national level but also on a corporate level. In this case, one technology, EMD, was able to have several outcomes on all the concerned parties. First, Siemens was able to enter the Korean market and establish a long-term partnership with a Korean company in Goldstar. They also were able to profit from the developmental loans of the German government. Second, Goldstar was able to cheaply import an advanced technology to secure their market leader position in the telecommunication field. Third, the Korean government was able to expand the telecommunication network which is an important basis for the development of the country. The first evidence for my arguments shown in this thesis was Siemens' participation in the developmental projects of the German government in the 60s. They participated in developmental aid projects in the electrical field especially concerning telecommunication and power plants. In fact, Siemens already started with technical aid before the official relation between the German and Korean government started in 1961. Yet, they were also the leader of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft which was a group of German businesses that participated in developmental aid projects requested by the Korean government. Those projects were part of the first five-year economic plan. Focusing on the AG, it shows how Siemens leveraged their influence to establish a monopoly on the developmental projects and a monopoly in the Korean telecommunication industry. In this case, they use their connections to the Korean government through their proxy Eisenberg to influence the German government in their decision making. The second evidence is the joint venture with Goldstar. Established in 1971 as the pinnacle of long-term cooperation in the telecommunication field with Goldstar, not only does it show the direct participation of the German government in private businesses concerning developmental aid, but also the influence that foreign private businesses had on the foreign policy strategies of their countries. This was best shown in the ESS crisis, where political leader of multiple countries lobbied for their technology and their national businesses. The Goldstar Tele-electric joint venture also showed how foreign investors in Korea established and managed their presence. In the case of Goldstar Tele-electric, the division of tasks was key for the success of the business. Siemens provided the technology and knowledge while Goldstar provided their knowledge over the Korean market. The company itself was completely Korean in its structure, strategy, and culture. On one hand, Siemens profited extremely from the low wages and hard-working, disciplined labor. On the other hand, they were introducing new technology and advanced the technical training and education in the company and in the country. Goldstar, too, profited from cheap technology transfer and available capital through loans with good conditions from the developmental aid projects. It is obvious that there were also problems concerning the cultural and traditional understanding between the two partners. The contribution of this study is threefold. First and foremost, this thesis enabled a new perspective on the field of developmental aid by focusing on the business perspective and the business-government relation which might be more influential than previous thought. Second, it contributed to the German-Korean relation history by telling the story of a German company in Korea in general and various unknown and forgotten histories like the AG and German-Korean joint ventures. Third, it gave new insight in the degree of cooperation between private businesses and governments in general. The limits of this study are as follows. A case study should have the goal to universalize. In the end, however, this study only shows the case of Siemens itself and how it acted concerning Korea. In order to generalize the experience of foreign companies in Korea during the economic development period, there needs to be further research, especially from other countries that heavily participated in developmental aid like the US and Japan. Second, the closed nature of Korean businesses concerning their history that manifests itself in the lack of large and organized corporate archives is not only a problem for the research of this study but the field of business history studies in Korea in general. Therefore, further research on foreign businesses in Korea is heavily dependent on materials from public corporate archives and governmental archives. For researching especially business-government relations, it is beneficial to acquire materials from the government archives. Further research on this topic would be beneficial for a new perspective on the developmental era.