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병자호란 이후(1640~1642년) 쓰시마에 대한 조선의 입체적인 교섭 논리: 1640년 문위행과 이후 파생된 교섭을 중심으로

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dc.contributor.author박정슬-
dc.date.accessioned2022-05-30T07:26:43Z-
dc.date.available2022-05-30T07:26:43Z-
dc.date.issued2021-09-30-
dc.identifier.citation한국문화, Vol.95 No., pp. 73-104-
dc.identifier.issn1226-8356-
dc.identifier.other20-950003-
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10371/180151-
dc.description.abstractAfter the Manchu Invasion of the Joseon in 1636(丙子胡亂), the Qing began to
exercise the pressure the Joseon in three different ways: arranging relations between the
Qing and the Japan, sending huge amount of annual tributary payment(歲幣), and
mobilizing soldiers and weapons to fight against the Ming.
Firstly, the Joseon made it very clear that they will never pay the role of an
intermediary between the Qing and the Japan helping them to initiate the diplomatic
relations, after which they leaked the false information about the Japan to the Qing. The
leakage, made of lies, includes that the Japan was not in a suitable environment to have
a relationship with the Qing. For example, the Japan being far away from the sea to
exchange envoys with, or the Japan being suspicious with likelihood of preparing a war
against the Continent, like the Japanese Invasion of the Joseon in 1592(壬辰倭亂).
The second and third pressures of the Qing were difficult to deal with due to the
exhaustion of the Joseons resources after the war. Especially annual tributary payment,
the Joseon had to seek constant and stable routes to procure goods from overseas
because the Qing included items that could only be obtained by importing them. In
addition, annual tributary payment and sending troops, which were very burdensome for
the Joseon to afford, often ignited various diplomatic problems with the Qing. This
made the Joseon gradually realize that they were in an uneasy position to safeguard
their interest in the East Asia.
This difficult situations caused by the Qing affected the negotiation attitude of the
Tsushima(對馬) in south. Its intelligence capabilities reached the Northwestern(關西)
region of the Joseon, linking the northern situation related to the Qing with negotiations
from the south. The Tsushima recognized that the Joseon was in a position underpressures from the Qing, and used it in their favor in the negotiations with Joseon,
making opportunities to go in a offensive way.
In this Northern Barbarian and Southern Wako(北虜南倭) situation, the Joseon
responded to the Tsushima in two directions. As the Joseon sought a breakthrough for
managing the Qings demands using the Japan, the Joseon counteracted the aggressive
Tsushima, utilizing the Qings pressures in their favor.
The complex responses were revealed by the Joseons multi-layered negotiation logics.
The Joseon had to establish a logic to resolve economic and military pressures of the
Qing through the Japan, ensuring it less explicit that the Joseon was under such
pressures from the Qing or that the Joseon obeyed the Qing as a tributary state(朝貢國).
The Joseon began it with the logic that Trade with the Ming was inevitably cut off
because the Qing made the surrendered the Ming admirals attack the Ga-island(椵島)
and territory of Yyodong(遼東), resulting in the Joseon were no longer able to receive
the gold and weapons in the exchange of the Ming. So we ask the Tsushima the gold.
Moreover, the Joseon completed their negotiation logics not by mentioning annual
tributary payment but by adding a lie with plausible cause of requesting the gold
necessary for ornaments or medicinal materials to the Tsushima. At the same time, with
the diplomatic abilities and strategy, the Joseon managed the Tsushima cleverly when
they tried to scrutinize the situations in the Joseon to find out what the Joseon was
hiding to them.
Additionally, due to the affair of forgery of diplomatic documents in the Tushima(柳
川一件), negotiation attitude of the Tsushima also changed making the Joseons response
logic more multi-layered. The Tsushimas initial attitude of maximizing the Shogunate(將
軍)s interests, expectations, and authority toward the negotiation with the Joseon was
more often witnessed. However, the Joseon did not tolerate this either and established a
new negotiation logic.
-
dc.description.sponsorship이 논문은 2019년 한국연구재단의 글로벌박사펠로우십 지원을 받아 수행된 연구임(NRF-2019H1A2A1076091).-
dc.language.isoko-
dc.subject병자호란-
dc.subject북로남왜-
dc.subject-
dc.subject쓰시마-
dc.subject조선-
dc.subject교섭 논리-
dc.subject문위행-
dc.subject세폐-
dc.subject
-
dc.subject아명도서-
dc.subject외교의 행위자-
dc.subjectManchu Invasion of the Joseon in 1636-
dc.subjectNorthern Barbarian and
Southern Wako
-
dc.subjectthe Qing-
dc.subjectthe Tsushima-
dc.subjectthe Joseon-
dc.subjectNegotiation
Logic
-
dc.subjectEnvoys to Console the Tsushima Governor-
dc.subjectAnnual Tributary
Payments
-
dc.subjectJapan Town-
dc.subjectSeal under Childhood Name of the Tsushima
Governor’s son
-
dc.subjectAgent in Diplomacy-
dc.title병자호란 이후(1640~1642년) 쓰시마에 대한 조선의 입체적인 교섭 논리: 1640년 문위행과 이후 파생된 교섭을 중심으로-
dc.typeSNU Journal-
dc.citation.journaltitle한국문화-
dc.citation.endpage104-
dc.citation.pages73-104-
dc.citation.startpage73-
dc.citation.volume95-
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