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Estimating dynamic games of electoral competition to evaluate term limits in us gubernatorial elections

Cited 12 time in Web of Science Cited 12 time in Scopus
Authors

Sieg, Holger; Yoon, Chamna

Issue Date
2017-07
Publisher
American Economic Association
Citation
American Economic Review, Vol.107 No.7, pp.1824-1857
Abstract
This paper shows how to identify and estimate, using standard semi-parametric techniques, a class of dynamic games with perfect monitoring, that have been at the frontier of recent research in political economy. The empirical analysis provides novel quantitative insights into the trade-off that voters face between ideology and ability, the differences in ability and ideology among parties and states, and the differences in preferences between political candidates and voters. We analyze the consequences of term limits and quantify their relative importance. Specifcally, we characterize conditions under which term limits improve voters' welfare.
ISSN
0002-8282
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/10371/200344
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20150566
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