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Quality communication via cheap-talk messages in experimental auctions
DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Lee, Jaesun | - |
dc.contributor.author | Shapiro, Dmitry | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-05-14T07:25:22Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2024-05-14T07:25:22Z | - |
dc.date.created | 2023-07-12 | - |
dc.date.created | 2023-07-12 | - |
dc.date.created | 2023-07-12 | - |
dc.date.created | 2023-07-12 | - |
dc.date.created | 2023-07-12 | - |
dc.date.issued | 2023-08 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol.212, pp.74-107 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 0167-2681 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10371/202036 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper examines the incentives of low-quality sellers to truthfully communicate their product quality in an environment where high-quality sellers cannot fully separate them-selves. Private information about the product's quality can be conveyed through cheap-talk messages, and products are sold in one of four auction formats: first-price (FPA), second -price (SPA), all-pay (APA), or sealed-bid double auctions (DA). Our study finds that low -quality sellers can benefit from honestly communicating their quality under certain cir-cumstances, such as in risky auction formats (DA and APA) and when there is a low prior probability of high-quality products. We also observe that low-quality claims can be more profitable, regardless of the competitiveness of the environment. Finally, we demonstrate that sellers' ability to set reservation prices does not improve communication regarding product quality.& COPY; 2023 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. | - |
dc.language | 영어 | - |
dc.publisher | Elsevier BV | - |
dc.title | Quality communication via cheap-talk messages in experimental auctions | - |
dc.type | Article | - |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.05.004 | - |
dc.citation.journaltitle | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization | - |
dc.identifier.wosid | 001015336900001 | - |
dc.identifier.scopusid | 2-s2.0-85161077313 | - |
dc.citation.endpage | 107 | - |
dc.citation.startpage | 74 | - |
dc.citation.volume | 212 | - |
dc.description.isOpenAccess | N | - |
dc.contributor.affiliatedAuthor | Shapiro, Dmitry | - |
dc.type.docType | Article | - |
dc.description.journalClass | 1 | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | REPUTATION | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | MARKET | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | ECONOMICS | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | PREFERENCES | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | UNCERTAINTY | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | INFORMATION | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | COMPETITION | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | DECEPTION | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | BEHAVIOR | - |
dc.subject.keywordPlus | LEMONS | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Negative information | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Auctions | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Cheap talk | - |
dc.subject.keywordAuthor | Information disclosure | - |
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