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Dividends as a signaling device and the disappearing dividend puzzle

Cited 0 time in Web of Science Cited 8 time in Scopus
Authors

Shapiro, Dmitry; Zhuang, Anan

Issue Date
2015-05
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Citation
Journal of Economics and Business, Vol.79, pp.62-81
Abstract
In this paper we develop a generalization of the Baker and Wurgler (2012) signaling model where investors are loss-averse to dividend cuts. We apply our framework to study how a firm's characteristics and manager's incentives affect payout policy properties. In equilibrium firms with riskier earnings are less likely to pay dividends, however, those that pay, payout more. Similarly, firms whose managers have a higher share of stock options in their compensation package are less likely to pay positive dividends. There is a clientele effect. Investors' preferences and choices affect the payout policy and two otherwise identical firms can greatly differ in how they pay dividends. Finally, we relate our model's predictions to the disappearing dividend puzzle. © 2015 Elsevier Inc.
ISSN
0148-6195
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/10371/202048
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconbus.2014.12.005
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