The Early Wittgenstein on Logic and Metaphysics

Abstract

It is fairly well known that Wittgenstein was deeply critical of metaphysics in the Tractatus. It is little known, however, that he did not begin with such a critical attitude. In the first substantial philosophical work he produced in October 1913, Notes on Logic", Wittgenstein writes: Philosophy consists of logic and metaphysics: logic is its basis. (Wittgenstein 1979, p.106) Far from being critical, Wittgenstein seems to suggest here that metaphysics does comprise one of the two legitimate parts of philosophy. On the other hand, he expresses in no uncertain terms in 6.53 of the Tractatus that all metaphysical remarks are nonsense and that the task of philosophy is to reveal their nonsensicality through the analysis of language: The right method of philosophy would be this. To say nothing except what can be said, i.e. the sentences of natural science, i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy: and then always, when someone else wished to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had given no meaning to certain signs in his sentences.(Tractatus, 6.53)