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Which principal gets more : optimal contracts with multi-principal and multi-agent

DC Field Value Language
dc.contributor.advisor이인호-
dc.contributor.author황일우-
dc.date.accessioned2010-01-07-
dc.date.available2010-01-07-
dc.date.copyright2008.-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://dcollection.snu.ac.kr:80/jsp/common/DcLoOrgPer.jsp?sItemId=000000041955eng
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10371/27472-
dc.descriptionThesis(masters) --서울대학교 대학원 :경제학부(경제학전공),2008. 8.en
dc.format.extent16 leavesen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisher서울대학교 대학원en
dc.subject주인-대리인 모형en
dc.subjectPrincipal-agent modelen
dc.subject복주인문제en
dc.subjectMulti-principalen
dc.subject복대리인문제en
dc.subjectMulti-agenten
dc.subject공모en
dc.subjectCollusionen
dc.subject다중균형en
dc.subjectMultiple Equilibriaen
dc.subject순차계약게임en
dc.subjectSequential contracts gameen
dc.titleWhich principal gets more : optimal contracts with multi-principal and multi-agenten
dc.typeThesis-
dc.contributor.department경제학부(경제학전공)-
dc.description.degreeMasteren
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