롤즈와 평등주의: 경제적 혜택의 분배에 관한 철학적 논의의 한 사례

Abstract

Contrary to Rawls, G. A. Cohen does not think that the basic structures, major public institutions including ones that govern tax and transfer, are the only effective and legitimate mechanism through which egalitarian distribution is achieved. According to Cohen, egalitarianism needs a distinctive kind of ethos that guides personal choices and behavior as well as the disposition to observe relevant public rules. Especially, for the optimal realization of its Difference Principle, Rawlsian justice simply needs what Cohen calls an egalitarian ethos, a pervasive motivational ground in everyone, but especially in talented people. When this ethos prevails, the latter would maintain high productivity and willingly agree to a redistribution that would restore economic equality on a higher level than the initial equality (Rawls benchmark of justice). They would not demand economic incentives for the activation of pure talent out of their strategic bargaining, letting the others(the untalented) have only relatively small part of the expanded output(trickle-down effect), thereby creating and deepening an unequal distribution. This paper has three aims. First, it attempts to clarify the nature of Cohens criticism of Rawls. I think that there is an eminent possibility that Cohens criticism of Rawls belongs to the category of internal criticism. An internal criticism of Rawls will keep all or most of the major Rawlsian principles intact, while denying some of Rawlss minor principles, predictions, and assertions concerning implementation of his principles. Not only are there some textual grounds for this interpretation, but Cohens discussions are clearly conducted in the Rawlsian spirit, without being directly informed by Cohens views on the other matters of equality, his discussions of the proper currency of egalitarian justice and his version of luck egalitarianism. Second, I indicate certain mistakes in some defenses of the (untainted) Rawlsian frame against Cohens charges. I argue that if the internal reading of Cohens engagements with Rawls is correct, and if Cohens suggestions in this regard are independently defensible, Rawlsians should accept them. Their resistance to Cohens internal criticism may be prompted by their mistaken views about the flexibility of the Rawlsian frame or about the way Rawlss principles apply to the real world. Lastly, I briefly point to a particular way Cohens concerns go beyond the Rawlsian frame and can be connected to other views of equality Cohen has been advocating. Without trying to adjudicate upon the confrontation of Rawlss with Cohens systematic egalitarianism (partly because the latter is not given yet at the moment), I will just allude to some distinctively un-Rawlsian features of this version of Cohens view.