Domestic Conditions, Rational Choice, and Foreign Conflicts

Abstract

The main task of this study is overcoming the pitfalls of power-politics in theories of international relations. I point out that power-politics might have missed a consideration about actors interaction. In the study, actors are not merely assumed as power or security maximizers. They are modeled to have a conjecture about the rivals intention and possible actions in international crisis. I analyze a general game of international crisis in an effort to explain the theoretical linkage between domestic constraints or inducements to use force and the likelihood of foreign conflicts under conditions of two-sided incomplete information. Therefore. uncertainty about the rivals type composes a basic part of my modeling.

My model helps us to identify the conditions under which the existing hypotheses about the effects of domestic conditions on foreign conflicts are sustained or rejected. The analysis provides a prospective explanation for oft observed rally-round-the-flag effects; the tendency for libertarian states to eschew violence with one another; and the propensity for domestic disputes to beget foreign conflict. It also shows conditions under which those same hypotheses are not expected to hold. thereby providing a theoretical basis for improved empirical assessments. The game theoretic analysis allows me to specify the theoretical conditions under which the prospects for peacefully resolved disputes are enhanced or diminished. The analysis also captures the problem of misperception hypothesis.