Blackburn on the Ban on Mixed Moral Worlds

Abstract

This is a realist response to Blackburns version of the explanatory inadequacy of the moral thesis based on the ban on mixed worlds, and to its possible explanatory reductionism version. First, the moral supervenience relationship is made explicit, for the ban on mixed worlds has been expressed most commonly by employing the notion of moral supervenience. This is done to clarify the implications of the ban. Second, it will be argued that the dependence relationship between the two is self-explanatory, given the dependence relationship expounded here. This will allow us to show that there is no such modal fact as the ban on mixed worlds for projectivists such as Blackburn to explain. Third, I shall consider and reject a possible rejoinder from Blackburn: explanatory reductionism. A nonreductive physicalistic type of moral realism can still fail if it can be shown that all of the explanatory power possessed by the supervening properties is reducible to the explanatory power provided by the subvening properties. This is especially so when the explanation is understood as closely related to causation. It will be shown that the causal power of supervening properties is irreducible to their subvening properties, while it is acknowledged that further work has to be done in establishing the falsity of the explanatory reductionism of moral facts to nonmoral facts. 이 글은 혼성도덕세계 금지를 그 예로 하는 블랙번의 도덕사실 설 명부적합성에 대한 도덕실재론자의 답변이다. 첫째로 도덕수반의 개 념에 대하여 살펴보고, 둘째로 이 글에서 옹호하는 도덕수반의 개념 을 받아들이면 블랙번과 같은 투영주의자가 설명해야하는 그런 양상의 하나인 혼성세계금지란 투영주의에 따르면 실재하지 않으며, 실재론자의 입장에서는 그 도덕수반이 가장 근본적이거나 또는 여 기서의 도덕수반 보다 더 근본적인 관계에 의거해 설명 가능함을 보인다. 마지막으로 블랙번의 입장에서 가능한 설명환원주의를 논 의, 비판한다.