The Choice of Local Governments under Two Principals: The Case of Tax Hike Policy of South Korea Noncompliance of Local Governments to Tax Hike Policy

Abstract

The Korean central government introduced a package of tax hikes on real estate in order to achieve tax levy equity. This remarkable tax innovation, however, resulted in conflicts between the cnetral government, residents, and local governments, which were followed by area-wide tax competitions among the local governments in the Seoul Metropolitan Area (SMA). This study analyzes the property tax resistance of the SMA using the form model approach to the principal and agent. It is assumed in the study that residents, local governments, and the central government have a divided principal-agent relationship. With several descriptive analyses and some data for the case, however, the theoretical model gives a logical explanation for the behaviors of residents, local governments, and the central government in the short-term tax resistance. That is, under short-term conditions, local governments tend to respond to residents' request for tax cuts, dependent upon their fiscal independence and neighboring local jurisdictions' decision-making on property tax cuts. The pattern of the property tax cuts over time implies that local government's elected officials may be very sensitive to their re-election. Further, it provides long-term prediction for the behavior of the three actors, dependent upon institutional change. When the information on institutional change is perfect, or the uncertainty is removed in the institutional change, they ultimately reaach the Nash equilibrium. Finally, it is fair to say that the formal model contributes to this study by complementing the lack of empirical data/precedent literatures, and clarifies the causality between the factors of interest.