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비선호시설의 입지에 따른 정부간 갈등의 원인과 해결에 대한 게임이론적 고찰
A game-theory approach in the analysis and resolution of inter-governmental conflicts: the location of non-preferred facilities

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Authors
김종석; 강은숙
Issue Date
2008-12
Publisher
서울대학교 행정대학원
Citation
행정논총, Vol. 46 No. 4, pp. 351-377
Keywords
게임이론정부간 갈등비선호시설game theoryinter-governmental conflictnon-preferred facilities
Abstract
이 논문은 외부비용을 유발하는 비선호시설의 입지와 관련하여 동일수준의 정부간에 발생하는 갈등과 상위정부와 하위정부 및 지역주민 간에 발생하는 갈등의 원인과 해법을 게임이론적 틀을 통해 살펴보았다. 기존의 문헌에서 진단하고 있는 갈등상황이 죄수의 딜레마게임이 아님을 밝혀내고 새롭게 진단된 게임상황에서의 편익구조와 사전적 불공평성이 갈등을 초래하고 있음을 밝혀 내었다. 이러한 갈등을 없애거나 최소화하기 위해서는 보상메커니즘의 도입, 무작위선택기제의 도입, 무작위선택기제와 보상메커니즘의 동시 도입, 보상지 출을 전제로 한 공모제도의 도입이 대안이 될 수 있음을 역설하였다. 이러한 대안이 게임상황에서의 편익구조를 어떻게 변화시켜 원하는 균형상태에 도달할 수 있는지를 살펴보았다. This article sets up a game-theory model that explains the reason for inter-governmental conflict at the same level or at different levels with respect to the location of non-preferred facilities. It also presents solutions to resolve it in the same game-theory framework. The study shows that the conflict is not of the prisoners' dilemma type, as has been usually presumed by previous studies. The main reason for conflict turns out to be critically dependent on the payoff structure of the game and the deficiency of proper decision rules. In order to solve this problem, a new set of institutional arrangements needs to be introduced. For this purpose three new mechanisms are reviewed - the compensation schemes, the random choice mechanism, and the public invitation of candidates with ex ante fixed compensation. Incorporating each mechanism into a new modified game separately or in combination, it was found that the Nash equilibrium does not contain any conflict element. The result comes from the fact that each mechanism contributes to the change in the payoff structure of the new game and thus in its Nash equilibrium.
ISSN
1229-6694
Language
Korean
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10371/70010
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Graduate School of Public Administration (행정대학원)Dept. of Public Administration (행정학과)Korean Journal of Public Administration (행정논총)Korean Journal of Public Administration (행정논총) vol.46(4) (2008)
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