S-Space College of Humanities (인문대학) Institute for Cognitive Science (인지과학연구소) Journal of Cognitive Science (인지과학작업) Journal of Cognitive Science (인지과학작업) vol.03 (2002)
Rules andIntentionality in the Generative Lexicon
- Frath, Pierre
- Issue Date
- Journal of cognitive science, Vol.3 No.2, pp. 139-154
- This paper examines the notions of rules and intentionality in the Generative
Lexicon from a point of view based on Wittgenstein, Kripke and Peirce. It
argues that rules cannot explain language because any set of rules must be
triggered by another in an endless recess and because rules do not have meaning
in themselves and require intentionality at every step of their implementation.
Furthermore, it is argued that intentionality cannot be an attribute of the lexicon.
An alternative view on lexical meaning inspired from Peirce's semiotics is
offered in the final sections.
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