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Analogical Uses of the First Person Pronoun: A Difficulty in Philosophical Semantics

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Authors
Pelletier, Jérôme
Issue Date
2004
Publisher
Institute for Cognitive Science, Seoul National University
Citation
Journal of Cognitive Science, Vol.5 No.2, pp. 139-155
Abstract
A common human enterprise is to try to understand what another human
will do, how he will act, in terms of oneself. Many philosophers and
psychologists agree that humans often predict what another will do by, in imagination, placing themselves in the others situation and simulating the
others mental economy. On the basis of his own psychological responses
during this exercise of imagination, the simulator then may predict what the
other will do. Simulation theorists argue that human competence in predicting
behaviour, and more generally in mindreading, depends mainly on a capacity
for mental simulation1. Most simulation theorists suppose that two steps are
needed in an exercise of prediction: a replication in oneself in some significant
respects of the others situation and mental states and an implicit analogical
inference to the effect that the individual simulated is in the same or in similar
mental states.
ISSN
1598-2327
Language
English
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/10371/70757
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College of Humanities (인문대학)Institute for Cognitive Science (인지과학연구소)Journal of Cognitive Science (인지과학작업)Journal of Cognitive Science (인지과학작업) vol.05 (2004)
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