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Pay-for-Performance and Work Motivation: Comparing Motivation between Two Compensation Systems in US Federal Agencies

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Authors
Lee, Geon
Issue Date
2012
Publisher
Graduate School of Public Administration, Seoul National University
Citation
Korean Journal of Policy Studies, Vol.27 No.1, pp. 87-108
Keywords
pay-for-performancepay systemsmotivation
Description
This paper, part of the authors doctoral dissertation, was presented at the 2010 Southeastern
Conference on Public Administration (SECOPA) in Wilmington, North Carolina, USA.
Abstract
While private-sector managerial practices are being widely adopted in
the public sector, few studies have investigated how market mechanisms influence
the motivation or behavior of members of public organizations, or whether there
is a systematic difference in employee motivation or behavior between marketcentered
settings and traditional civil service environments within the public
sector. Analyzing large-scale survey data, this study investigates the difference
in employee motivation between two compensation systems in the US federal
government: pay-for-performance and general schedule. The empirical findings
show that employees working in pay-for-performance systems tend to place a
higher value on extrinsic values such as pay, performance ratings, and promotion
than those in general-schedule systems. This indicates that market-centered
managerial practices may undermine the public service motivation of public
servants while attracting extrinsically motivated employees to the public sector.
ISSN
1225-5017
Language
English
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/10371/77260
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Graduate School of Public Administration (행정대학원)Dept. of Public Administration (행정학과)Korean Journal of Policy Studies (정책논총)Korean Journal of Policy Studies (정책논총) vol.27 no.1-3 (2012)
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