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A Defense of Free Enrichment from Stanleys Binding Argument
스탠리의 속박 논변으로부터 자유로운 풍부화 옹호

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Authors
정지문
Issue Date
2012-08
Publisher
서울대학교 철학사상연구소
Citation
철학사상, Vol.45, pp. 227-256
Keywords
Philosophy of LanguagePragmaticsContextualismSemanticismFree Pragmatic EnrichmentBinding ArgumentJason Stanley맥락주의의미주의자유로운 풍부화속박 논변제이슨 스탠리
Abstract
In this paper, I defend and refine the contextualist thesis that there are processes of free pragmatic enrichment that contribute to the explicitly expressed proposition. First, I closely examine a major
argument against the thesis, the so-called Binding Argument (BA), made by Jason Stanley (2000), and, finally, refute it on the grounds that it begs the question. Even if the charge of begging the question were not
the case, one of its main assumptions, the Coincidence Assumption, in itself is empirically problematic or at least needs further justification. Finally, I adopt and expand the point briefly made in Section 4.2 of Jung (2010) on how a bindable variable for the bound interpretations of the examples used in the BA is pragmatically introduced in an alternative framework of our language faculty supported by Jackendoff (e.g., 1997),
not in the one by Chomsky that the argument assumes.
ISSN
1226-7007
Language
English
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/10371/79628
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College of Humanities (인문대학)Philosophy (철학과)철학사상철학사상 43/46호 (2012)
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