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A Defense of Free Enrichment from Stanleys Binding Argument : 스탠리의 속박 논변으로부터 자유로운 풍부화 옹호
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- Authors
- Issue Date
- 2012-08
- Publisher
- 서울대학교 철학사상연구소
- Citation
- 철학사상, Vol.45, pp. 227-256
- Keywords
- Philosophy of Language ; Pragmatics ; Contextualism ; Semanticism ; Free Pragmatic Enrichment ; Binding Argument ; Jason Stanley ; 맥락주의 ; 의미주의 ; 자유로운 풍부화 ; 속박 논변 ; 제이슨 스탠리
- Abstract
- In this paper, I defend and refine the contextualist thesis that there are processes of free pragmatic enrichment that contribute to the explicitly expressed proposition. First, I closely examine a major
argument against the thesis, the so-called Binding Argument (BA), made by Jason Stanley (2000), and, finally, refute it on the grounds that it begs the question. Even if the charge of begging the question were not
the case, one of its main assumptions, the Coincidence Assumption, in itself is empirically problematic or at least needs further justification. Finally, I adopt and expand the point briefly made in Section 4.2 of Jung (2010) on how a bindable variable for the bound interpretations of the examples used in the BA is pragmatically introduced in an alternative framework of our language faculty supported by Jackendoff (e.g., 1997),
not in the one by Chomsky that the argument assumes.
- ISSN
- 1226-7007
- Language
- English
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