The U.S. Carter Administration and Korea in the 12/12 Incident: Concession of Moral Diplomacy

Abstract

The Carter administration knew that the 12/12 incident that occurred in South Korea in 1979 was a coup detat that would hamper the countrys process of democratization.

However, it did not take positive action to thwart it. According to the relevant materials, including declassified documents, the Carter administration detected the possibility of a coup detat in South Korea and de cursory efforts, including informing the South Korean government of such, what it actually implemented on December 12, 1979, and its stance in the period following the incident, was nothing more than passive adaptation to the altered situation. Such an attitude taken by the Carter administration was the result of the domestic factors that were prevalent in Korea at the time, such as the absence of an optional faction due to the inability of the Choi Gyu-ha administration and the fear of a recurrence of a coup detat, combined with the securityrelated concerns pertaining to Northeast Asia in the shape of confusion in South Korea and the Norths miscalculation. Simultaneously, the Iran hostage crisis in the American Embassy in Iran in the same year also served as a factor that impacted the way the Carter administration responded to the 12/12 incident in South Korea.