Browse

Honesty and Intermediation: Corporate Cheating, Auditor Involvement and the Implications for Takeoff

Cited 0 time in Web of Science Cited 0 time in Scopus
Authors
GUHA, BRISHTI
Issue Date
2012-12
Publisher
College of Business Administration (경영대학)
Citation
Seoul Journal of Business, Vol.18 No.2, pp. 55-93
Keywords
Corporate governanceauditingdisclosureinequality and takeoffgeneral equilibriumrepeated games
Abstract
We examine honesty and credible auditing in rm-investor relations in a repeated game of imperfect information, embedded in a general equilibrium framework. Informed auditors enhance credibility over a range of audit fees – despite the auditors incentive to collude – provided the probability of detection is imperfectly correlated across clients. Auditing can enhance growth especially for a relatively egalitarian distribution of wealth. We show that audit fees must be neither too high nor too low to enhance client credibility, highlight the role of mandatory audit

fee disclosure, interpret international differences in shareholding patterns and uncover a possible rationale for audit industry concentration.
ISSN
1226-9816
Language
English
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/10371/80817
Files in This Item:
Appears in Collections:
College of Business Administration/Business School (경영대학/대학원)Dept. of Business Administration (경영학과)Seoul Journal of BusinessSeoul Journal of Business Volume 18, Number 1/2 (2012)
  • mendeley

Items in S-Space are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.

Browse