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Nash Implementation under Allocative Constraints
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Ju, Biung-Ghi | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-02-27T05:46:36Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-02-27T05:46:36Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2012-12 | - |
| dc.identifier.citation | 경제논집, Vol.51 No.2, pp. 367-378 | - |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1738-1150 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10371/81194 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | In exchange economies, we investigate social choice rules that can be implemented in
Nash equilibrium under some allocative constraints. Allocative constraints can represent standard normative requirements such as efficiency and fairness and are formulated by a fixed set of allocations from which outcome functions (of game forms) can take values. We show that an extended notion of Maskins monotonicity[Maskin(1977, 1999)] is a necessary and sufficient condition for Nash implementation under allocative constraints. | - |
| dc.description.sponsorship | This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean Government (NRF-2010-330-B00077) and by SNU Development Fund (JUEUN Economic
Research Fund). | - |
| dc.language.iso | en | - |
| dc.publisher | 서울대학교 경제연구소 | - |
| dc.subject | Nash implementation | - |
| dc.subject | Social choice rules | - |
| dc.subject | Exchange economies | - |
| dc.subject | Monotonicity | - |
| dc.title | Nash Implementation under Allocative Constraints | - |
| dc.type | SNU Journal | - |
| dc.contributor.AlternativeAuthor | 주병기 | - |
| dc.citation.journaltitle | 경제논집 | - |
| dc.citation.endpage | 378 | - |
| dc.citation.number | 2 | - |
| dc.citation.pages | 367-378 | - |
| dc.citation.startpage | 367 | - |
| dc.citation.volume | 51 | - |
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