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An Optimal Incentive Tax Policy on Horizontal Mergers
DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Lee, Sang-Ho | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-06-19T01:33:57Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2013-06-19T01:33:57Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2013-04 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Seoul Journal of Economics, Vol.26 No.2, pp. 239-254 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 1225-0279 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10371/82799 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper analyzes an optimal antitrust policy on horizontal mergers under asymmetric information when antitrust agency cannot observe the post-merger private cost of merged firms. By using a discrete mechanism design approach with self-selection, this paper proposes an incentive compatible lump-sum tax scheme to provide an efficient decision on whether the application for merger should be accepted or rejected. Results show that the optimal size of lump- sum tax is not affected by the informational rent of private post- merger cost information of merged firms. | - |
dc.language.iso | en | - |
dc.publisher | Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University | - |
dc.subject | Antitrust policy | - |
dc.subject | horizontal merger | - |
dc.subject | Asymmetric information | - |
dc.subject | Lump-sum tax | - |
dc.subject | incentive compatibility | - |
dc.subject | Mechanism design | - |
dc.title | An Optimal Incentive Tax Policy on Horizontal Mergers | - |
dc.type | SNU Journal | - |
dc.contributor.AlternativeAuthor | 이상호 | - |
dc.citation.journaltitle | Seoul Journal of Economics | - |
dc.citation.endpage | 254 | - |
dc.citation.number | 2 | - |
dc.citation.pages | 239-254 | - |
dc.citation.startpage | 239 | - |
dc.citation.volume | 26 | - |
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