Comparative Analysis of Laws on Information and Tangibles in the U.S. and Korea from the Perspective of Transaction Cost Economics

Abstract

For decades, legal scholars have debated whether and how much legal protection should be conferred on commercially valuable information. As a result, various ad hoc legislative solutions for information have

been proposed, some of which have been adopted by most countries. Though necessary to promote the development of information technologies, legislation and its enforcement are social tools that take costs.

Thus, it is also necessary to avoid devising and maintaining redundant and inconsistent laws. Transaction cost economics has been shedding light on providing bases for economizing legal tools. Based on the concept of the transaction cost, this Article purports to provide a theoretical ground for minimal and consistent laws on information: consistent not only among different laws on information, but also between laws on information and tangibles. Lawmakers should understand that the fundamental difference between laws on information and tangibles arises from the difference in transaction costs of internalizing externalities.