푸틴 집권기 엘리트그룹의 권력경쟁
Power Competition among Elite Groups under Putin

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서울대학교 러시아연구소
러시아연구, Vol.17 No.2, pp. 363-390
Focusing on the dynamics of elite groups and of social powers during Putin's term, this paper explores whether Putin would lead Russia into an authoritarian and anti-market state or not. Critics who regard the policies of Putin as authoritarian and anti -market ones, have suspected Siloviki of being responsible for Putin's policy line. They also come to the conclusion that the Siloviki group is a dominant elite group within the Putin regime. However, because Putin has made efforts to consolidate his power by arbitrating among various elite groups, it is difficult for a specific group to come to predominance. Also Siloviki has consistently to compete with the technocrat group, the liberal group, and the 'Family-Oligarch' group. For instance, the conflict between Gazprom and Rosneft for merging a major asset after the liquidation of Yukos showed the intense competition among elite groups in the Putin regime. This case reveals that even until much later in Putin's second term, none of the significant groups can obtain

predominance. Simply technocrat's political status is toning up only gradually. Then, this technocrat group IS expected to strengthen Putin's reform line for bureaucracy. Nowadays the social power of entrepreneurs is rising in Russia. Then

this trend may combine with the efficient bureaucracy reformed by the technocrat group, and will lead to economic growth. But despite Putin's support for market economy, the state bureaucracy reform led by the technocrat group brings about excess of administration's power. At the same time, Putin has complicated the condition of power competition among elite groups, only to prolong his political power even into post-Putin era. As a result, this excess of administration's power and intense power competition among groups led by Putin for himself cannot develop democracy but brings about political authoritarianism. In conclusion, the policy line of the Putin regime has become a cohabitation between a market supporting tendency and political authoritarianism.
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College of Humanities (인문대학)Institute for Russian, East European & Eurasian Studies (러시아문화권연구소)러시아연구 (Russian Studies)러시아연구 Volume 17 Number 1/2 (2007)
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