보호주의, 자유주의, 수정주의: 미국 무역정책의 사회적 기반
- Issue Date
- 서울대학교 미국학연구소
- 미국학, Vol.17, pp. 117-148
- This study takes the so-called social coalitonal approach to analyze the changing nature of U. S. generic trade policy since the Civil War-from the formation of the system of 1896 and ensuing protectionism, to the collapse of the Republican hegemony the formation of the New Deal coalition, the birth of the post-WWII liberalism, the demise of liberal hegemony, and to the current subtle balance among free traders, protectionists, and revisionists. Advocated by such scholars as Ronald Rogowski and Peter Gourevitch, social coalitional approach provides a useful tool to investigate the complex relationship among economic interests, social forces rallying behind them, political forces and coalitions sprung out of social forces, and the nature of political regimes and certain policies. Yet social coalitional approach has its own flaws and needs refinement. While analyzing the develoment of U.S. generic trade policy, I suggest three aspects of social coalitional explanation that needs theoretical improvement. First, Rogowskis unit
of analysis-that is, capital, labor, and agriculture-is too broad to capture the dynamic formation of sectoral interests within them. more careful analysis of sectoral interests and the coalition among them are needed. Second， the salience of trade issues in the realignment process should be considered. Trade issues sometimes exerted great influence on dealigning and realigning political coalitions， but other times they merely functioned as secondary issues. Futhermore， trade issues were salient to cerlain sectoral interests and social forces, but not important at all to others at the same time. The 1etter point has an important implication for the collapse of governing political/policy coalitions. Finally, I a1so
suggest to look at governing political coalitions and policy coalitions separately. A
triumphant politcal coalition tries to establish its hegemony over trade policy area by reinventing institutions to its advantage. The institutionalization thus makes governing policy coalitions in t1'ade policy area which incorporate the whole or the parlial segment of the political coalition. The process of institutionalization may take time and the institutionalized policy coalition may resist change even after the hegemony of its political coalition has already collapsed. The so-called lag could be understood in this context.