자아개념의 인식적 특성

Abstract

본 논문은 자아개념의 중요한 특성들을 정교화 하기 위하여 주로 Shavelson, Hubner 그리고 Stanton (1976), Song(1982), Song과 Hattie(1986), 송인섭(1989, 1997) 등에서 추론했던 자아개념의 인식적 특성들이 논의된다. 자아개념에 대한 연구는 인간에 대한 관심만큼이나 긴 역사의 탐구기간을 갖고 있다. 이러한 역사를 갖고 있는 자아개념을 어떻게 보느냐에 대한 인식론을 통합한다는 것은 이론과 실제적인 측면에서 그 어려움을 가지고 있다. 그러나 지금까지의 자아개념 연구의 문한 고찰을 통해서 그를 정리하고자 한다. 자아개념은 다차원적일 뿐만 아니라 위계적이라는 측면이다. 다음으로 일반 자아개념의 잠재성이다. 더욱 방대한 연구의 결과들은 자아개념은 한 개인에게 있어 유일무이한 특성이라는 점이다. 유일무이할 뿐만 아니라, 이 특성은 한 개인의 행동과 관련지어 진다. 그러나 하나의 행동은 아니고 우리가 어떻게 행동하는지에 영향을 줄 수 있으나 우리의 행동을 지배하지는 않는다. 자아개념의 형성과 관련하여 자아개념은 중요 타인의 영향, 상황, 그리고 환경의 영향을 크게 받는다는 연구결과가 누적되어있다. 끝으로 자아개념은 세대에 따라 가중치의 변화에 영향을 받고, 안정적 측면이 있다. 이상의 자아개념에 대한 논의가 현재까지의 자아개념의 인식적 특성이라고 볼 수 있다.

The notion of a hierarchy of the self-concept has parallels in the physical world. Rychlak (1968) argued that "a hierarchical concept is immediately suggested when one thinks of the formal properties of particulars, each of which belongs to a certain class of now more abstract, universal forms" (p. 377). Furniture, for example, denotes a class of objects. Tables and chairs are specific examples of furniture, but the term furniture is not merely an aggregation of many types of furniture. The form of the relationship between types of furniture is not obvious nor necessarily agreed upon. However, furniture is a higher-order concept then tables and chairs. Furniture has at least three levels, with the term furniture at the top, the specific objects such as tables and the chairs next, and the more specific attributes (such as round tables, oak tables, or hard-backed chairs, metal chairs) next. Similarly with self-concept : there is the general term ; then academic self-concept, social self-concept, and presentation of self; then the more specific attributes. Like furniture, general self-concept is mot merely the simple additive combination of the lower order characteristics. "Essentially, we climb the ladder of abstracting, moving up these inference levels, leaving out more details, formulating higher-and higher-order abstractions. This ladder has no ceiling; one can always make an abstraction of an abstraction (termed self-reflexivity)" (p. 14) The theory of self-concept defended here allows for the various aspects of self-concept to be differentiable, especially at the lower-orders of the hierarchy. There have been many viewpoints expressed as to the interrelatedness or otherwise of the various facets of the self. Moreover these viewpoints range from those that claim that there is a dominant core to those that regard the person more as a committee with a multiplicity of selves. It must be emphasized that self-concept is not an entity or homonculus that exists in a person. It is not a unity that only waits to be discovered, nor is it necessarily important to some people. Self-concept is merely a set of beliefs, and relationships between these beliefs, that we have about ourself. The set of beliefs is usually known in that we can tell others and/or voice aloud these beliefs. The relationships between the beliefs are usually more difficult to express, often because we are never asked to identify or express those relationships. The latent aspect of self-concept related primarily to these relationships, and, hence, self-concept is latent more that at the apex than at the lower levels of our model. Self-concept is only one aspect of a person, and its salience and meaningfulness differs among persons. Self-concept is not synonymous with person, personality, or character. Calkins(1910) argued that each person's self concept is unique and irreplaceable. There is no doubt that every person has a unique self-concept because every person has a different upbringing, has a different location in time and space, and has developed a different belief system from which to view the world. Each person discovers the world in a different way. Rosenberg(1979) added that each person's self perspective is unique, although not necessarily more or less accurate than other perspectives. Although one person may see him or herself as another sees him or her and may well hold a similar belief system to that person, the first person will not share all the same conceptions of self as the second. There are commonalities across individuals and these refer to the structure and processes of self-concept. Self-concept is not behavior, although it may be derived from behaviors and may guide, mediate and regulate behavior. Our conceptions of self can affect how we behave, but they do not govern our behavior (see Ryle, 1949; Segal & Stacy, 1975). We rarely ask "Who am I?" and then modify our behavior as a result. We may act, however, in tune with our self-concept (Erikson, 1959). Each of us has an implicit (or, very rarely, an explicit) theory of our (and others') personality and its affect on our behavior. Our self-concept guides us "at an executive level, leaving for other processes the mechanics of action. The self sets goals, has intents, and evaluates, while the scripts are executed through more simple processes of associations, learning, and overlearned response patterns" (Lowis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979, p. 26).