WTO 보조금협정상 수입대체보조금과 GATT 3:4

Abstract

One of the most frequently litigated provision of the WTO Agreements is

Article 3 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM

Agreement). Article 3 of the SCM Agreement prohibits export subsidies and

import substitution subsidies. In contrast with export subsidies, import

substitution subsidies have not been successfully invoked under the WTO

dispute settlement procedures. This paper examines the underlying reasons for

the virtually dormant provision, and demonstrates how this problem can be

addressed.

In a few WTO dispute settlement cases, complainants actually invoked

Article 3:1(b) that prohibits import substitution subsidies. The United States ―

Foreign Sales Corporation case is an example. Nonetheless, nether parties

actively argued on Article 3:1(b), and the panel did not address this issue,

relying on the judicial economy. Instead, the panel resolved the same issue on

the basis of Article Ⅲ:4 of the GATT.

In the authors' view, this is due to the lack of clarity in the substantive

standards determining the contingency requirement under Article 3:1(b) of the

SCM Agreement. In contrast, Article Ⅲ:4 of the GATT has relatively clearer

standards, and that is the reason why both the parties and the panel relied on

the latter. This tendency, however, poses some systemic problems. First, two

provisions have something in common, whereas both pursue different goals. In

addition, the SCM Agreement provides for special dispute settlement

procedures for cases involving import substitution subsidies. Therefore,...