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미국 금융개혁의 정치경제: JP 모건 사례
The Political Economy of Financial Reform in the United States: The Case of J.P. Morgan & Co.

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Authors
이왕휘; 김용기
Issue Date
2013
Publisher
서울대학교 미국학연구소
Citation
미국학, Vol.36 No.2, pp. 57-92
Keywords
J.P MorganFinancial ReformFinancial RegulationNew DealGlass-Steagall Act
Abstract
To cure the causes of the global financial crisis-including speculation, ‘too big to fai’ problem, excessive compensation, short-selling, and perversive corporate governance-U.S. Congress passed the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) in 2010. Nonetheless, the introduction of additional reformative measures controlling the general practices of financial institutions’ excessive leverage-i.e., Volcker Rule and specific regulation on systematically important financial institutions-which are necessary to prevent the recurrence of financial crises, has been in a deadlock. To understand the current deadlock over financial reform, this essay investigates the financial reform in the 1900s∼30s when the federal regulatory framework had been formed with special reference to J.P. Morgan & Co.. The company, though a private institution, had enormous financial resources, control of major industrial companies through interlocking directorates, and personal networks of politicians and officials. There was a widespread concern that the unelected power would harm democracy. To curb the influence of the company in the Progressive era and the New Deal, the US government and Congress pushed ahead with financial reform through various political and legal actions, notably the Pujo Committee (1912), the Pecora Commission (1932) and the anti-trust litigation (1947). Against the political and legal actions, new regulatory institutions, such as the Glass-Steagall Act, was able to introduce, being a decisive contribution to restrain arguably the strongest financial company in the early 20 century and to reduce the likeliness of financial crises’ recurrence. Therefore, the case of J.P. Morgan reminds us why and how political and legislative support are required to acquire the power for financial reform, which is difficult to promote because of the regulator’s being captured by the financial institutions’ private interest.
2007년 발생한 세계금융위기가 금융산업에 내재된 다양한 문제들-투기, 대마불사, 과도한 성과급, 공매도, 허술한 기업지배구조 등-에서 기인했다고 할 수 있다. 위기의 재발을 막기 위해 강력한 금융규제가 필요하다는 인식이 정관계와 학계는 물론 업계에서도 심각하게 고려하고 있다. 이번 금융위기의 발원지인 미국에서는 2010년 발효된 월가 개혁 및 소비자보호법(도드-프랑크 법: Dodd-Frank Act)을 통해 1980년대 이후 진행되어온 금융자유화의 문제점들을 치유하기 위한 조치를 취하였다. 금융개혁에 대한 공감대가 광범위하게 존재하고 있음에도 불구하고 금융기관의 고질적인 레버리지(leverage)-자기자본 대비 부채비율-확대 관행을 막기 위해 추가적으로 도입된 개혁조치들인 볼커 룰(Volker Rule)-

자기자본거래(proprietary trading) 제한-의 도입이나 ‘시스템적으로 중요한 금융기관(systemically important financial institutions)’의 자기자본비율[BIS capital ratio]의 상향 조정은 금융기관들의 강력한 저항에 부딪쳐 특별한 진전을 나타나지 않고 있다. 이들은 이러한 규제의 강화가 금융기관의 신용공급능력을 약화시켜 경기회복을 더디게 할 것이라 경고하고 있다.
ISSN
1229-4381
Language
Korean
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10371/92234
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Researcher Institutes (연구소)American Studies Institute (미국학연구소)미국학미국학 Volume 36 Number 1/2 (2013)
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