Alternative Theoretical Perspectives on the Political Economy of International Environmental Policy

Abstract

In seeking to explain international behavior with regards to forging international environmental agreements, it is common to assume that countries act like unitary actors. While assuming that states act much like unitary actors certainly facilitates theoretical tractability, it involves forsaking analysis of the domestic determinants of international behavior. Clearly, the international political economy of international environmental agreements has its roots in the very real, and quite often pivotal, domestic political forces behind countries international negotiating positions. In this paper, we canvass the alternative theoretical perspectives within the political science and economics literatures that may enable us to more clearly connect (and thus explain) the domestic determinants of international behavior. We compare and contrast various perspectives for understanding the political economy of international public good provision involving the protection of the environment, illustrating various points through reference to the Montreal Protocol to preserve the ozone layer. The paper charts recent theoretical developments in the literature as well as directions for future research.