대안적(代案的) 분쟁해결제도(ADR)의 경제학 -환경분쟁조정제도에 대한 평가를 중심으로-

Abstract

When individuals need to resolve their disputes with other individuals, they

may often go not only to courts for trial but also to alternative methods of

dispute resolution (ADR). Drawing upon a few recent studies, this article

provides some economic explanation about why individuals make use of ADR

instead of trial and/or settlement. By examining what the social interest is in

ADR, it also provides a useful reference point by which one can evaluate the

ADR system the Environmental Dispute Adjustment Act has developed to cope

with complicated environmental disputes.

Part I begins with defining the characteristics of environmental disputes that

make environmental litigation less frequent. Due to the tendency of

under-litigation involving environmental disputes, ADR is particularly needed

for environmental disputes. An ADR system aiming at environmental disputes

needs to be designed so as to i) minimize the total cost of resolving disputes,

and simultaneously ii) to engage as many parties involved as possible and make

an ideal communication structure where the parties involved can provide each

other with the relevant information(Part II). Part III looks over the cost structure

of ADR. The dispute resolution costs of ADR consist of ADR-using

cost(operation cost) and misjudgment cost(error cost). To save the former, it

is necessary to trade off the latter. Accordingly, an ideal ADR system must be

such that the sum of both can be minimized. In general, ADR brings about less

operation costs than a trial before the courts. Therefore the success of ADR

depends upon how much it can minimize error costs. If one can design an ideal...