SHERP

Equilibrium Inferences from the Choice of Forum

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Authors
Park, Juhyun
Issue Date
1993
Publisher
Seoul Journal of Economics
Citation
Seoul Journal of Economics 6 (No. 3 1993): 241-256
Keywords
signalling model; cheap-talk; two-audience model
Abstract
This paper studies a signalling model with two audiences. In which the relationship between the sender and one audience is reverse to that of the sender and the other audience. When the sender chooses a forum after observing his type, the receivers make inferences about the sender's type not only from the message but also from the choice of forum; this influences the equilibrium. We present two models and analyze .the equilibrium, which differ in whether the sender can commit the choice of communication or not.
ISSN
1225-0279
Language
English
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/10371/1021
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College of Social Sciences (사회과학대학)Institute of Economics Research (경제연구소)Seoul Journal of EconomicsSeoul Journal of Economics vol.06(3) (Fall 1993)
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